


Current knowledge on climate tipping points: Should we change climate policy?



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Outline

- Current knowledge on tipping points

- Implications for adaptation policy?




Tipping point early warning potential

- Implications for mitigation policy?

Affect on the social cost of carbon




Bifurcation-type tipping point




(System state)

Tipping elements in the climate system




Risk knowledge



Likelihood of tipping points


- Imprecise probability statements from experts formally combined.
- Under 2-4 °C warming: >16% probability of passing at least one of five tipping points
- Under >4 °C warming: >56% probability of passing at least one of five tipping points




Potential physical impacts of passing different climate tipping points

Tipping event	Temperature	Sea level	Precipitation	Atmospheric circulation	Ocean circulation	Biogeochemical cycles	Modes of variability	Extreme events
Arctic summer sea-ice loss	↑ Arctic & N. Hem. warming	(minimal effect)	Local shift from snowfall to rainfall	↓ polar vortex, shift in storm track	Intrusion of warm Atlantic waters	↑ Permafrost thawing, ↑ CO ₂ , CH ₄	Shift in NAO centre of action	Cold winters in Europe
Greenland ice sheet meltdown	Local ↑	≤ 7 m global ≤ 0.5 m/century uneven	Local shift to rainfall	Less jet stream deflection?	↓ THC, loss of Irminger Sea convection	Flooding of permafrost, ↑ CO ₂ , CH ₄	?	Storm surges, icebergs
West Antarctic ice sheet collapse	Local ↑	≤ 3.3 m abrupt ≤ 1 m/century uneven	Local shift	Uneven polar vortex?	↓ or ↑ THC, Archipelago created	Flooding of permafrost, ↑ CO ₂ , CH ₄	?	Iceberg armadas storm surges
Atlantic thermohaline circulation (THC) shutdown	↓ N. Atlantic ↑ S. Hem.	Regional shifts ↑ 0.5m in parts of N. Atlantic	Drying of Sahel, collapse of WAM, wetting Amazonia	Southward shift of ITCZ, Atlantic storm track shift	Fundamental reorganisation	↑ CO ₂ , biome changes	AMO ceases, ↑ ENSO	Cold winters in Europe, hurricanes shift south?
ENSO increase in amplitude	↑ S Asia, S Australia... ↓ in NZ	Regional effects	↓ SE Asia, E Australia, Amazon...	Walker circulation change	↑ THC, warming Ross, Amundsen seas	↑ CO ₂ , reduced land C storage	Coupled changes to PDO, AMO	Droughts, floods
Indian summer monsoon (ISM) weakening	Local ↑ summer	-	↓ in India	[inherent]	?	?	Coupling to SO?	Drought in India, heatwaves
West African monsoon (WAM) collapse	↑ in Sahel ↓ coastal W. Africa	-	Sahel wetting/drying? (uncertain)	Inflow of moist air from Atlantic to W?	?	Possible greening of Sahel/Sahara	Coupling to THC?	Source region for Atlantic hurricanes
Amazon rainforest dieback	↑ regional	-	↓ regional	Walker circulation?	-	↑ CO ₂	Feedback to ENSO?	Droughts, fires, loss biodiversity
Boreal forest dieback	↓ winter ↑ summer	-	↓ regional?	Regional effects?	-	↑ CO ₂	-	Fires, insect pests, biome loss


Tipping point early warning prospects




Early warning of a modelled tipping point



- The Atlantic Meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) is currently monitored at 26°N
- Freshwater forcing of the 'FAMOUS' ocean-atmosphere GCM causes collapse of the AMOC
- There are early warning signals



Where are the best early warning signals? How early are they?




Red areas indicate early warning signals that are significant at $p < 0.05$

from testing against 10,000 instances of a null model where the original data are bootstrapped to destroy their memory


Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) index

$n = 1343$




Implications for marine ecosystems


- Marine ecosystems act as integrators of ocean sea surface temperature (SST) variability with their own characteristic damping timescale
- The surface ocean typically has a faster damping timescale (~6 months) than e.g. zooplankton populations (~2 years)
- Slowing down of ocean SST variability causes marine ecosystems to become more correlated with it, more variable, and more likely to pass tipping points if they have them



Conventional cost-benefit analysis




Adding uncertain tipping points to a widely-used integrated assessment model




The DSICE model – based on Nordhaus’ DICE-2013 model
as used in US Federal Social Cost of Carbon estimates

Representation of tipping points in DSICE



Tipping element	Hazard rate (%/yr/K)	Transition time (years)	Final damages (% world GDP)
Atlantic overturning (AMOC)	0.063	10-50-250	10-15-20
Greenland ice sheet (GIS)	0.188	300-1500-7500	5-10-15
West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS)	0.104	100-500-2500	2.5-5-7.5
Amazon rainforest (AMAZ)	0.163	10-50-250	2.5-5-7.5
El Nino (ENSO)	0.053	10-50-250	5-10-15

Effect on carbon tax growth rate (equivalent to discount rate)



Expected additional
carbon tax with DSICE
climate tipping point

Total carbon tax
with no climate tipping
point modeled


Additional tax in a
deterministic setting
with a degree 4
damage function

Additional tax in a
deterministic setting
with a degree 6
damage function





Why the low discounting of tipping point damages?

- Stochastic uncertainty over future damages produces a variance on expected future consumption (as well as a direct negative impact upon it)
- The ‘social planner’ (policymaker) wants to reduce the variance on future consumption (as well as try and limit the reduction in magnitude of future consumption)
- This leads to a precautionary, insurance-type policy response: we discount future impacts much less and hence are willing to pay a high premium now to try and avoid future tipping points


Tipping events and their causal interactions



Tipping events are connected A→B if at least 5 experts judged that triggering A had a direct effect on the probability of triggering B thereafter



Effect of interactions in a tipping point cascade



Conclusion: We should change policy

- If business-as-usual continues then climate tipping points are expected to become high impact *high* probability events
- Early warning methods exist for tipping points and have been successfully tested before past abrupt changes and in model scenarios
- Temperature fluctuations have slowed down across large regions of the ocean contributing to past marine ecosystem 'regime shifts'
- Tipping point early warning systems could be developed as an aid to adaptation to forewarn societies and trigger pre-emptive action
- The threat of multiple, interacting, uncertain climate tipping points should be triggering stronger mitigation activity now to reduce their likelihood
- The risk of tipping points should *not* be discounted at market interest rates
- The optimal policy response from a standard cost-benefit model with a realistic specification of risk aversion is a carbon price today of >\$100/tCO₂